A Middle Ground between Realpolitik and Neo-containment

I am a Russian citizen myself, and an opponent of the current Putin's regime and its policies, but more importnatly I feel myself a global citizen and therefore in my post I will try to look at the issue not only in terms of the relations between the US and Russia, but also beyond that.

To start with, I believe that the very rhetoric of "spheres of influence" and "backyards" is a thing of the past not much suitable for a 21st century world. John Elliot rightly mentioned that the current Russian leadership views the world in terms of 19th century Realpolitik, but why should the US start speaking with Russia in the same outdated language? If Realpolitik becomes the accepted language of relationship between the US and Russia, it will be a step back from even the current imperfect architecture of the international relations, where narrowly defined national interests and ambitions do not always determine policy outcomes, despite the realists' claim to the contrary. Even the collapse of the global order (similar to the one in 1914) may become a reality, as is well argued by Paul Krugman in his recent op-ed in IHT (see http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/15/opinion/edkrugman.php).

More specifically, the "spheres of influence" concession (or a bone if you will) to Russia will not make the countries in the Russian near abroad willing to bow easily to Russian pressure. It will, however, as in case with isolating Russia, threaten further dividing EU and NATO. It may also unnecessarily embolden Russia and other Realpolitik states such as China or Iran to continue or even step up irresponsible behavior in their "spheres of influence".

That said, I am also not a fan of neo-containment of Russia and other Realpolitik states, if neo-containment means some sort of isolation. First of all, as in case of playing by their rules, containing them will almost certainly fuel the Realpolitik (or even expansionist) mentality of the leadership of such states, not only through a cause-effect mechanism, but also through internal dynamics of such states. If you watch the hysteria in Kremlin controlled media in Russia these days or remember the massive outpour of Chinese nationalism in response to the Tibet criticism, you will see that the internal dimension of conflicts with the West is perhaps even more important than the external posture per se. Russian officials did not bother very much to convey their message or explain their position to the West but were very surprised when their saber-rattling aimed primarily at the Russian audience raised such an alarm in the western media. This very saber-rattling and relentless propaganda, however, have led to a sort of rally-round-the-flag effect which may have serious ramifications for any prospect of liberalization in Russia. The last thing the US would want is to strengthen the authoritarian regime in Russia by fueling the besieged fortress mentality.

The supporters of containment may argue that Russia has a stake in the current world institutional order and may be contained by a threat of exclusion from G8 or Russia-NATO Council or rejection of WTO membership. Russia is indeed interested in membership in these institutions. It also does not want to be viewed as an agressor or a bully (hence its insistence on the humanitarian nature of the military operation in Georgia).

However, the Russian stake in the international institutional order is still too limited to make Russia a responsible stakeholder exercising sufficient restraint in its actions. Thus, the urgent imperative is to think how to increase, rather than decrease that stake.

Is There a Middle Ground?

The seemingly simple conclusion that follows from the above is that the US and the West should find some middle ground between Realpolitik concessions and containment in relation to Russia which is easy only at first sight.

My short-term vision of such middle ground is that the US and its allies should not institutionally isolate Russia, at least unless Russia fails to end its military presence in Georgia outside South Ossetia proper soon.

It would be ideal if the US changed its controversial missile defense decision and relocated its missile defense systems from Poland to, say, Israel or Turkey in a sign of good will and in return for Russian cooperation on Iran and commitment to fully withdraw from Georgia.